This collection explores the controversial and perhaps even abject idea that evils, large and small, human and natural, may have a central positive function to play in our lives. For centuries a concern of religious thinkers from the Christian tradition, very little systematic work has been done to explore this idea from the secular point of view.

This is the first book to offer a systematic comparison of the philosophies of Albert Camus and Frantz Fanon. It shows how the ethical, political, and psychological outlooks of these two influential thinkers can further our understandings of how to bring about justice in the face of deep power imbalances. The author foregrounds the bloody Algerian War of Independence in his analysis of the philosophies of Camus and Fanon. Although neither supported French colonial occupation of Algeria, they held radically different (...) views of the conflict. Fanon supported emancipation through violence, which the author argues has been uncritically romanticized. Camus, on the other hand, supported an ethics of moderation that shunned indiscriminate violence. The author argues that Camus has been unfairly accused of being an apologist for colonialism. Finally, the author draws out the common endorsement of humanist values that drive both Camus' and Fanon's thought. Camus and Fanon on the Algerian Question will appeal to scholars and advanced students interested in twentieth-century Continental philosophy, postcolonialism, existentialism, and African philosophy. (shrink)

This piece is one of among a handful that seek in the first instance to reveal the origin of African philosophy as an academic discipline, the source of its unity and distinctiveness. The discipline of African philosophy originates in tragedy, out of pain, confusion and rage stemming from colonial destruction; destruction that is responsible for what Fanon calls the ‘negro neurosis' caused by what Biko would describe as the unbearable fusion of colonised and coloniser. I argue that the birth of (...) African philosophy as an academic discipline is largely responsible for its character and, crucially, for its distinctive creative possibilities. South African Journal of Philosophy Vol. 27 2008: pp. 285-295. (shrink)

In this paper I criticize political realism in International Relations for not being realistic enough, for being unrealistically pessimistic and ultimately incoherent. For them the international arena will always be a place where a battle of wills, informed by the logic of power, is fought. I grant that it may be true that the international political domain is a place where such battles are fought, but this alleged infelicitous situation does not in and of itself entail the normative pessimism informing (...) their assessments of the international domain, and it does not entail the recommendations offered by political realists, particularly relating to balance of power concerns. Their lack of realism stems from total or partial blindness to the proper and coherent ideals that ought to be informing their analyses of the international domain. Such blindness does not allow them properly to grasp what actually is the case. As we can only properly understand what an eye is by knowing the ideal that defines eyes — proper vision — so too we can only properly identify the movements of the international political arena in relation to ideals that ultimately define this arena, ideals that stem from a proper understanding of the human person. Following an Aristotelian teleological technique of analysis, I show that ideals are a constitutive part of the international domain and I recommend an alternative to political realism, namely, realistic idealism (or, if you prefer, idealistic realism). (shrink)

Being at Home stimulates careful conversation about some of the most pressing issues facing higher education institutions in South Africa today - race, transformation, and institutional culture. While there are many reasons to be despondent about the current state of affairs in the South African tertiary sector, this book is an invitation for the reader to see these problems as opportunities for rethinking the very idea of what it is to be a university in contemporary South Africa. It is also, (...) more generally, an invitation to think about what it is that the intellectual project should ultimately be about, and to question certain prevalent trends that affect - or, perhaps, infect - the current global academic system. The volume will be of interest to all those who are concerned about the state of the contemporary university, both in South Africa and beyond. [Subject: African Studies, Higher Education]. (shrink)

Acknowledgements Abbreviations of Works by Aristotle 1 Introduction: A Basic Topography of the Ethical Domain 2 Ethics and Personhood 3 The Eudaimon Principle 4 Logos 5 The Method of Critical Introspection 6 Personhood and Community 7 Our Political Nature Select Bibliography Index.

Happiness: Personhood, Community, Purpose (Happiness from now on) is, among other things, a book about the holistic interrelationship that exists between the concepts of happiness, rationality and ethics. The conception of happiness at issue is, in broad outline, Aristotle's, which is to say that it is about the meaning of life. He referred to this conception as eudaimonia. Perhaps the fundamental guiding question that has motivated me to write Happiness in the first place is ‘Why even bother about being ethical?' (...) After a long period of nihilistic scepticism regarding the possibility of properly addressing this question, I came to see in Aristotle a possible solution, and I ran with it. I am still running. The relevant sense of rationality at issue allows us to claim that we are rational creatures as opposed to the sense that is most directly related to our characterisation of persons as creatures capable of conscious rational thinking. I argue that happiness is a rational ideal, understood as a manner of operating. And this manner of operating cannot properly be understood in isolation from an understanding of the ethic from which human goodness flows. Moreover, I argue that individual happiness cannot be separated from what I characterise as collective eudaimonia and what this in effect means is that the theory of happiness that I advance entails a particular conception of the political domain. The conception at issue, as we shall see, is, in key respects, very un-Aristotelian. That said, it is in an other sense very Aristotelian indeed insofar as I argue that being ethical is constitutive of happiness and, presumably and in some sense, we all want to live happy lives. Being ethical, moreover, involves working to create and perpetuate the social conditions for human flourishing. S. Afr. J. Philos. Vol.23(4) 2004: 336-342. (shrink)

In this piece I will focus on what I think is a central aspect of Albert Camus’s thinking, embodied in the distinction he makes in The Rebel between rebel and revolutionary. His is a philosophy of rebellion and he thinks that revolutions are a distorted expression of our need to rebel against that which we cannot accept. His views should serve as a counterpoint to those who think that an all-or-nothing approach to social change is desirable. And the issue here (...) is not that embodied crudely in the reactionary /radical dichotomy. Rather, it is a defence of the need to rebel within limits, not so much to preserve the old against the threat of the new but, instead, to preserve basic human decency from the dark side of outrage, without dismissing what is crucial about outrage and emancipatory struggles. (shrink)

This collection embodies a debate that explores what could be characterised as the tension between judging and understanding.

Frantz Fanon's revolutionary psychiatry aimed to help constitute a postcolonial Algeria that recognised the humanity of all its members and, more widely, a Third World liberated of the shackles of colonial misrecognition. Fanon offers us an account of how a politics of misrecognition can give way to a politics of recognition. However, the violent means by which he thought a society guided by the ideal of mutual recognition could be achieved from the remnants of a colonial order cannibalised his democratic (...) aims. I contrast Fanon's views with Hanna Arendt's on the role of violence and her republicanism. I argue that her views are more promising than Fanon's because they foster mutual recognition if adequately embodied in the political sphere. However, tragically, colonial Algeria did not present the conditions for a new democratic order to thrive, mainly due to France's protracted and uncompromising brutality. (shrink)

In Black Skin, White Masks Frantz Fanon discusses the neurotic condition that typifies the oppressed black subject, their 'psychoexistential complex'. He argues that this neurotic condition is closely related to another, the 'psychoexistential complex' of the white oppressor. Both of these complexes sustain and are sustained by social and economic injustice. But Fanon does not delve in detail into the nature of this second neurosis, for he was primarily interested in discussing this neurosis only insofar as it helps him understand (...) the first. My aim in this paper is to provide an account of the white neurosis, and why it should be understood literally as a neurotic condition. Typical, white oppressors, not solely those who are militantly committed to oppressing others, are alienated from the world and from themselves, making their behaviour seem like that of soulless dolls, to use J.M. Coetzee's image from Age of Iron. (shrink)

Davidson develops an argument that establishes the most basic set-up for rationality. The minimal set-up is a triangle formed by two subjects and an object. Each of the two subjects occupies one of the three angles and the third angle is occupied by a subject matter – that about which the two subjects are in communication with one another. I extend Davidson's argument somewhat and show how an entire pluralistic community is required for individuals to develop most fully as rational (...) creatures. I do this by showing how the basic conditions for rationality set out by Davidson would start to crumble in conditions such as those set out in Orwell's Nine teen Eighty-Four. The ideal, as opposed to the minimal, set-up for rationality is not a triangle, but a pluralistic network of subjects. And indeed, the ideal conditions for rationality are to a large extent just that because they allow for the full implementation of Davidson's minimal set-up. S. Afr. J. Philos. Vol.23(1) 2004: 54–68. (shrink)

In this preamble, we highlight some of the more recent work on gender and sexuality in African philosophy. We do this as a way of introducing the special issue on “African Philosophy, Women, and Feminism”. In particular, we outline and highlight the trajectory and intellectual landscape of several discussions on women and feminism in African philosophy in the issue, and in this way, build on some previous work on gender, women, sexuality and African philosophy.

This paper examines Pedro Tabensky's claims that rational human life has a single unifying purpose, and that there is an analogy between the skill of living and that of painting. It examines his arguments for the first claim, in particular the relation between ratio nality and different ways in which a life might be unified. For, in addition to the narrative or artistic unification which Tabensky favours, there is also (for example) the possibility of unifying one's life through (...) the adoption of a so-called monolithic end, such as pleasure (assuming that pleasure is monolithic). The paper also investigates the implications of each of these modes of unification for how we should understand the skill of living. According to the narrative or artistic model, living will indeed be like painting; however, according to the mono lithic-end model, living may be more like business management; and other models may make other analogies salient. All this will make a difference to our attitudes to events within our lives, for example, whether the inevitable disturbances within our lives are to be integrated or, rather, eliminated. S. Afr. J. Philos. Vol.23(4) 2004: 353-364. (shrink)

The incredible achievements of modern scientific theories lead most of us to embrace scientific realism: the view that our best theories offer us at least roughly accurate descriptions of otherwise inaccessible parts of the world like genes, atoms, and the big bang. In Exceeding Our Grasp, Stanford argues that careful attention to the history of scientific investigation invites a challenge to this view that is not well represented in contemporary debates about the nature of the scientific enterprise. The historical record (...) of scientific inquiry, Stanford suggests, is characterized by what he calls the problem of unconceived alternatives. Past scientists have routinely failed even to conceive of alternatives to their own theories and lines of theoretical investigation, alternatives that were both well-confirmed by the evidence available at the time and sufficiently serious as to be ultimately accepted by later scientific communities. Stanford supports this claim with a detailed investigation of the mid-to-late 19th century theories of inheritance and generation proposed in turn by Charles Darwin, Francis Galton, and August Weismann. He goes on to argue that this historical pattern strongly suggests that there are equally well-confirmed and scientifically serious alternatives to our own best theories that remain currently unconceived. Moreover, this challenge is more serious than those rooted in either the so-called pessimistic induction or the underdetermination of theories by evidence, in part because existing realist responses to these latter challenges offer no relief from the problem of unconceived alternatives itself. Stanford concludes by investigating what positive account of the spectacularly successful edifice of modern theoretical science remains open to us if we accept that our best scientific theories are powerful conceptual tools for accomplishing our practical goals, but abandon the view that the descriptions of the world around us that they offer are therefore even probably or approximately true. (shrink)

This paper argues that Pedro Tabenksy's Aristotelean understanding of true happiness overlooks the constitutive significance of the virtues and values of relationships of radical dependency. Tabensky's focus on the rational and contextual aspects of personhood as the locus for our social interdependence results in friendship relationships being taken as paradigmatic for social engagements. Through a sketch of some of the unique dimensions of the asymmetrical relations upon which our bodily functioning and personal identities inevitably depend, I show that this (...) focus risks perpetuating the lack of recognition of the value and significance of caring relations familiar to us in contemporary societies today. S. Afr. J. Philos. Vol.23(4) 2004: 394-401. (shrink)

This paper considers Tabensky's method of critical introspection, and in particular the conception of personhood that informs it. By interrogating the lives of pure hedonism, divinity and immortality from our already existing conception of personhood, Tabensky argues that such lives are incompatible with what it is to be a person, and desiring to live them is therefore irrational. Concentrating on the example of immortality, I argue that, while there are undoubtedly disadvantages associated with the immortal life, these are (...) contingent rather than essential to the notion of being a person. In fact, we have very little idea of the boundaries of that concept. The paper concludes by looking at the consequences of Tabensky's approach for issues surrounding moral vision and improvement, and new technologies of the person. S. Afr. J. Philos. Vol.23(4) 2004: 365-374. (shrink)

The no-miracles argument and the pessimistic induction are arguably the main considerations for and against scientific realism. Recently these arguments have been accused of embodying a familiar, seductive fallacy. In each case, we are tricked by a base rate fallacy, one much-discussed in the psychological literature. In this paper we consider this accusation and use it as an explanation for why the two most prominent `wholesale' arguments in the literature seem irresolvable. Framed probabilistically, we can see very clearly why realists (...) and anti-realists have been talking past one another. We then formulate a dilemma for advocates of either argument, answer potential objections to our criticism, discuss what remains (if anything) of these two major arguments, and then speculate about a future philosophy of science freed from these two arguments. In so doing, we connect the point about base rates to the wholesale/retail distinction; we believe it hints at an answer of how to distinguish profitable from unprofitable realism debates. In short, we offer a probabilistic analysis of the feeling of ennui afflicting contemporary philosophy of science. (shrink)

This major study examines the most fundamental categories in terms of which we conceive of ourselves, critically surveying the concepts of substance, causation, agency, teleology, rationality, mind, body and person, and elaborating the conceptual fields in which they are embedded. The culmination of 40 years of thought on the philosophy of mind and the nature of the mankind Written by one of the world’s leading philosophers, the co-author of the monumental 4 volume _Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations_ Uses broad (...) categories, such as substance, causation, agency and power to examine how we think about ourselves and our nature Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of human nature are sketched and contrasted Individual chapters clarify and provide an historical overview of a specific concept, then link the concept to ideas contained in other chapters. (shrink)

Scientific realists have suggested that changes in our scientific communities over the course of their history have rendered those communities progressively less vulnerable to the problem of unconcieved alternatives over time. I argue in response not only that the most fundamental historical transformations of the scientific enterprise have generated steadily mounting obstacles to revolutionary, transformative, or unorthodox scientific theorizing, but also that we have substantial independent evidence that the institutional apparatus of contemporary scientific inquiry fosters an exceedingly and increasingly theoretically (...) conservative form of that inquiry. I conclude that contemporary scientific communities are actually more vulnerable to the problem of unconceived alternatives than their historical predecessors, and I briefly suggest how we might seek to pursue scientific inquiry in a less theoretically conservative way. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Life Themes Definite descriptions and reference Truth Logical theory Meaning and related notions Individuals Persons and states of mind Subjects and predicates The bounds of sense Responses to skepticism Freedom and resentment Conclusion.

We are reviewing and summarizing evidence for the processes of acquisition of information outside of conscious awareness (processing information about covariations, nonconscious indirect and interactive inferences, self-perpetuation of procedural knowledge). A considerable amount of data indicates that as compared to consciously controlled cognition, the nonconscious information-acquisition processes are not only much faster but also structurally more sophisticated in the sense that they are capable of efficient processing of multidimensional and interactive relations between variables. Those mechanisms of nonconscious acquisition of information (...) provide a major channel for the development of procedural knowledge which is indispensable for such important aspects of cognitive functioning as encoding and interpretation of stimuli and the triggering emotional reactions. (shrink)

Given the fact that many people use Wikipedia, we should ask: Can we trust it? The empirical evidence suggests that Wikipedia articles are sometimes quite good but that they vary a great deal. As such, it is wrong to ask for a monolithic verdict on Wikipedia. Interacting with Wikipedia involves assessing where it is likely to be reliable and where not. I identify five strategies that we use to assess claims from other sources and argue that, to a greater of (...) lesser degree, Wikipedia frustrates all of them. Interacting responsibly with something like Wikipedia requires new epistemic methods and strategies. (shrink)

Many of the activities of clinical practice happen to, with or upon vulnerable human beings. For this reason numerous nursing authors draw attention to or claim a significant moral domain in clinical practice. A number of nursing authors also discuss the emotional involvement and/or emotional labour which is often experienced in clinical practice. In this article I explore the importance of emotion for moral perception and moral agency. I suggest that an aspect of being a good nurse is having an (...) emotional sensitivity to other human beings (patients), because this emotional sensitivity allows the nurse to perceive more accurately the context and perspective of the patient. It is thus important to the moral agency of the nurse and to morally sensitive clinical practice. As such education of the emotions should be a feature of the moral education of the nurse. A useful conception of the role of educated emotion in the moral life can be discovered in Aristotelian ethics. (shrink)

The assumption that we largely lack reasons for accepting testimony has dominated its epistemology. Given the further assumption that whatever reasons we do have are insufficient to justify our testimonial beliefs, many conclude that any account of testimonial knowledge must allow credulity to be justified. In this paper I argue that both of these assumptions are false. Our responses to testimony are guided by our background beliefs as to the testimony as a type, the testimonial situation, the testifier's character and (...) the truth of the proposition testified to. These beliefs provide reasons for our responses. Thus, we usually do have reasons, in the sense of propositions believed, for accepting testimony and these reasons can provide evidence for the testimonial beliefs we form. (shrink)

In the last thirty years, the problem of presupposition projection has been taken to provide a decisive argument for a dynamic approach to meaning, one in which expressions are not evaluated with respect to the ‘global’ context of utterance, but rather with respect to a ‘local context’ obtained by updating the global one with expressions that occur earlier in the sentence. The computation of local contexts is taken by dynamic analyses to follow from a generalization of the notion of belief (...) update. I argue that the dynamic approach is faced with a dilemma: in its pragmatic incarnation (Stalnaker), it is explanatory but not general; in its semantic incarnation (Karttunen and Heim), it is general but not explanatory. I suggest that the dilemma stems for a faulty understanding of ‘local contexts’, and I offer a new reconstruction of this notion which eschews belief update but offers a general and fully precise solution to the projection problem. (shrink)

The underdetermination of theory by evidence is supposed to be a reason to rethink science. It is not. Many authors claim that underdetermination has momentous consequences for the status of scientific claims, but such claims are hidden in an umbra of obscurity and a penumbra of equivocation. So many various phenomena pass for `underdetermination' that it's tempting to think that it is no unified phenomenon at all, so I begin by providing a framework within which all these worries can be (...) seen as species of one genus: A claim of underdetermination involves (at least implicitly) a set of rival theories, a standard of responsible judgment, and a scope of circumstances in which responsible choice between the rivals is impossible. Within this framework, I show that one variety of underdetermination motivated modern scepticism and thus is a familiar problem at the heart of epistemology. I survey arguments that infer from underdetermination to some reëvaluation of science: top-down arguments infer a priori from the ubiquity of underdetermination to some conclusion about science; bottom-up arguments infer from specific instances of underdetermination, to the claim that underdetermination is widespread, and then to some conclusion about science. The top-down arguments either fail to deliver underdetermination of any great significance or (as with modern scepticism) deliver some well-worn epistemic concern. The bottom-up arguments must rely on cases. I consider several promising cases and find them to either be so specialized that they cannot underwrite conclusions about science in general or not be underdetermined at all. Neither top-down nor bottom-up arguments can motivate any deep reconsideration of science. (shrink)

Reflection Principles are commonly thought to produce only strong axioms of infinity consistent with V = L. It would be desirable to have some notion of strong reflection to remedy this, and we have proposed Global Reflection Principles based on a somewhat Cantorian view of the universe. Such principles justify the kind of cardinals needed for, inter alia , Woodin’s Ω-Logic.

Engineering is 'the people-serving profession'. The work of engineers involves interaction with clients, other engineers, and the public at large. More than any other profession, their work also directly involves and affects the environment. This book makes the case that engineers have special professional obligations to protect and enhance the environment, and the authors - one, an engineer and the other, a philosopher - seek to provide an ethical basis for these obligations. In exploring these ethical issues, the authors aim (...) to show that engineers make a difference. The text opens with a series of case studies in which engineers face complex and challenging decisions about the environment. Succeeding chapters examine different ideas about environmental ethics for engineers, including professional codes and both modern and historical discussions of environmental responsibility. The book concludes with a collection of readings that complement the text. Students, as well as practising engineers, will find much of interest in this well-argued and thought-provoking book. (shrink)

1. Naturalism Naturalism, it has been said, is the distinctive development in philosophy over the last thirty years. There has been a naturalistic turn away from the a priori methods of traditional philosophy to a conception of philosophy as continuous with natural science. The doctrine has been extensively discussed and has won considerable following in the USA. This is, on the whole, not true of Britain and continental Europe, where the pragmatist tradition never took root, and the temptations of scientism (...) in philosophy were less alluring. Contemporary American naturalism originates in the writings of Quine, the metaphysician of twentieth-century science. With extraordinary panache, he painted a largescale picture of human nature, of language and of the web of belief. I believe that in almost every major respect, it is, like the picture painted by Descartes, the great metaphysician of seventeenth-century science, mistaken. But it evidently appeals to the spirit of the times. So it is worthy of critical examination and careful refutation. I shall argue that the naturalistic turn is a cul-de-sac – a turn that is to be passed by if we are to keep to the highroad of good sense. Naturalism, like so many of Quine’s doctrines, was propounded in response to Carnap. As Quine understood matters, Carnap had been persuaded by Russell’s Our Knowledge of the External World that it is the task of philosophy to demonstrate that our knowledge of the external world is a logical construction out of, and hence can be reduced to, elementary experiences. Quine rejected the reductionism of Carnap’s Logischer Aufbau, and found the idealist basis uncongenial to his own dogmatic realist behaviourism, inspired by Watson and later reinforced by Skinner. The rejection of reductionism and ‘unregenerate realism’, Quine averred, were the sources of his naturalism (FME 72). What exactly was this? We can distinguish in Quine between three different but inter-related programmes for future philosophy: epistemological, ontological and philosophical naturalism. Naturalized epistemology is to displace traditional epistemology, transforming the investigation into ‘an enterprise within natural science’ (NNK 68) – a psychological enterprise of investigating how the ‘input’ of radiation, etc., impinging on the nerve endings of human beings can ‘ultimately’ result in an ‘output’ of our theoretical descriptions of the external world.. (shrink)

This paper canvasses recent arguments in favor of commercial markets in human transplant kidneys, raising objections to those arguments on grounds of the role of injustice, exploitation, and coercion in compromising the autonomy of those most likely to sell a kidney, namely, the least well off members of society.

In the October 1937 number of Philosophy of Science Lindsay has made certain criticisms of the adequacy of the “operational method” of analyzing and giving meaning to the concepts of physics, documenting his criticisms chiefly from my own writings. In these criticisms he has made statements as to the method which I would by no means accept. This is not characteristic of his paper only, for I have seldom indeed seen a printed discussion of the method which I would accept (...) as being an adequate or sometimes even fair representation of what I understand by it. It will perhaps pay therefore if I attempt to state what I conceive it to be all about, particularly since I have never attempted such a comprehensive statement and since my own ideas on the subject have been developing since I first wrote in the Logic of Modern Physics. For one reason I have hesitated to do this, for fear of seeming to subscribe to the not uncommon idea that we are dealing with some elaborate and profound new theory of the nature of knowledge or of meaning. I believe that I myself have never talked of “operationalism” or “operationism”, but I have a distaste for these grandiloquent words which imply something more philosophic and esoteric than the simple thing that I see. What we are here concerned with is an observation and description of methods which at least some physicists had already, perhaps unconsciously, adopted and found successful—the practise of the methods already existed. What I have attempted is to analyze these successful methods, not to set up a philosophical system and a theory of the properties that any method must have if it hopes to be successful. Since I was concerned with a technique already extant, my principal method of getting others to see what the technique involved has been to exhibit examples of the technique in action, rather than to attempt any exhaustive characterization of the technique itself. (shrink)

We locate winning strategies for various ${\mathrm{\Sigma }}_{3}^{0}$ -games in the L-hierarchy in order to prove the following: Theorem 1. KP+Σ₂-Comprehension $\vdash \exists \alpha L_{\alpha}\ models"\Sigma _{2}-{\bf KP}+\Sigma _{3}^{0}-\text{Determinacy}."$ Alternatively: ${\mathrm{\Pi }}_{3}^{1}\text{\hspace{0.17em}}-{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{A}}_{0}\phantom{\rule{0ex}{0ex}}$ "there is a β-model of ${\mathrm{\Delta }}_{3}^{1}-{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{A}}_{0}\text{\hspace{0.17em}}\text{\hspace{0.17em}}+\text{\hspace{0.17 em}}{\mathrm{\Sigma }}_{3}^{0}$ -Determinacy." The implication is not reversible. (The antecedent here may be replaced with ${\mathrm{\Pi }}_{3}^{1}\text{\hspace{0.17em}}\text{\hspace{0.17em}}\left({\mathrm{\Pi }}_{3}^{1}\right)-{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{A}}_{0}:\text{\hspace{0.17em}}{\mathrm{\Pi }}_{3}^{1}$ instances of Comprehension with only ${\mathrm{\Pi }}_{3}^{1}$ -lightface definable parameters—or even weaker theories.) Theorem 2. KP +Δ₂-Comprehension +Σ₂-Replacement + ${\mathrm{\Sigma }}_{3}^{0}\phantom{\rule{0ex}{0ex}}$ -Determinacy. (Here AQI (...) is the assertion that every arithmetical quasi-inductive definition converges.) Alternatively: $\Delta _{3}^{1}{\rm CA}_{0}+{\rm AQI}\nvdash \Sigma _{3}^{0}$ -Determinacy. Hence the theories: ${\mathrm{\Pi }}_{3}^{1}-{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{A}}_{0},\text{\hspace{0.17em}}{\mathrm{\Delta }}_{3}^{1}-{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{A}}_{0}+\text{\hspace{0.17em}}{\mathrm{\Sigma }}_{3}^{0}-\mathrm{D}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{t}\phantom{\rule{0ex}{0ex}}$ -Det, ${\mathrm{\Delta }}_{3}^{1}-{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{A}}_{0}+\mathrm{A}\mathrm{Q}\mathrm{I}$ , and ${\mathrm{\Delta }}_{3}^{1}-{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{A}}_{0}\phantom{\rule{0ex}{0ex}}$ are in strictly descending order of strength. (shrink)

The aim of this study was to examine developmental differences in autobiographical memory using a novel test that assesses its semantic and episodic subcomponents. Forty-two children aged 7–13 years were asked to recall semantic information and episodic events from three different time periods. For the recalls of all events, sense of remembering or sense of just knowing was measured via the Remember/Know paradigm. Age-related differences were observed for episodic autobiographical memory whereas semantic autobiographical memory was characterized by a relative developmental (...) invariance. The increase with age was also found in the number of “Remember” responses and their justification in terms of the actual contextual information retrieved—factual, spatial, and, more especially, temporal details. These findings highlight developmental differences between the episodic and semantic subcomponents of autobiographical memory and support the view that mental ‘time travel’ through subjective time, which allows one to re-experience the past through self-awareness, is the last feature of autobiographical memory to become fully operational. (shrink)

This article explores three ways in which a cognitively entrenched mindreading (or 'theory of mind') system may bias our thinking as cognitive scientists. One issues in a form of tacit dualism, impacting scientific debates about phenomenal consciousness. Another leads us to think that our own minds are easier to know than they really are, influencing debates about self-knowledge, and about mindreading itself. And the third results in a bias in favour of empiricist over nativist accounts of cognitive development. The discussion (...) throughout is tentative and speculative, and can be regarded as an appeal for caution, as well as a call for further research. (shrink)

We define theories of bounded arithmetic, whose definable functions and relations are exactly those in certain complexity classes. Based on a recursion-theoretic characterization of NC in Clote , the first-order theory TNC, whose principal axiom scheme is a form of short induction on notation for nondeterministic polynomial-time computable relations, has the property that those functions having nondeterministic polynomial-time graph Θ such that TNC x y Θ are exactly the functions in NC, computable on a parallel random-access machine in polylogarithmic parallel (...) time with a polynomial number of processors.0 We then define three theories of weak second-order arithmetic which respectively characterize relations in the classes of alternating logarithmic time, logspace and nondeterministic logspace. (shrink)

This discussion note addresses Caleb Hazelwood’s ‘Practice-Centered Pluralism and a Disjunctive Theory of Art’. Hazelwood advances a disjunctive definition of art on the basis of an analogy with species concept pluralism in the philosophy of biology. We recognize the analogy between species and art, we applaud attention to practice, and we are bullish on pluralism—but it is a mistake to take these as the basis for a disjunctive definition.

Consider the concept combination ‘pet human’. In word association experiments, human subjects produce the associate ‘slave’ in relation to this combination. The striking aspect of this associate is that it is not produced as an associate of ‘pet’, or ‘human’ in isolation. In other words, the associate ‘slave’ seems to be emergent. Such emergent associations sometimes have a creative character and cognitive science is largely silent about how we produce them. Departing from a dimensional model of human conceptual space, this (...) article will explore concept combinations, and will argue that emergent associations are a result of abductive reasoning within conceptual space, that is, below the symbolic level of cognition. A tensor-based approach is used to model concept combinations allowing such combinations to be formalized as interacting quantum systems. Free association norm data is used to motivate the underlying basis of the conceptual space. It is shown by analogy how some concept combinations may behave like quantum-entangled particles. Two methods of analysis were presented for empirically validating the presence of non-separable concept combinations in human cognition. One method is based on quantum theory and another based on comparing a joint probability distribution with another distribution based on a separability assumption using a chi-square goodness-of-fit test. Although these methods were inconclusive in relation to an empirical study of bi-ambiguous concept combinations, avenues for further refinement of these methods are identified. (shrink)

In the axiomatic development of the logic of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics it is not difficult to set down certain plausible axioms which ensure that the quantum logic of propositions has the structure of an orthomodular poset. This can be done in a number of ways, for example, as in Gunson [2], Mackey [4], Piron [5], Varadarajan [7] and Zierler [8], and we summarise one of these ways in §2 below.

Sen’s capabilities approach offers a radical generalisation of the conventional approach to welfare economics. It has been highly influential in development and many researchers are now beginning to explore its implications for health care. This paper contributes to the emerging debate by discussing two examples of such applications: first, at the individual decision making level, namely the right to die, and second, at the social choice level. For the first application, which draws on Nussbaum’s list of capabilities, it is argued (...) that many capabilities are ambiguously or indirectly related to the right to die, but the ability to form a concept of the good life and plan one’s own life provides a direct justification for such a right. In the second application, the focus is specifically on healthcare rationing and it is argued that, although not committed to age based rationing, the capabilities approach provides a more natural justification of age related access to health care than the fair innings argument, which is often used to justify the alleged ageism inherent in quality adjusted life years maximisation. (shrink)

I contrast our own evidence for the hypothesis of organic fossil origins with that available in previous centuries, suggesting that the most powerful contemporary evidence consists in a form of projective support whose distinctive features are not well captured by familiar hypothetico-deductive, abductive, or even more recent and more technically sophisticated accounts of scientific confirmation. I suggest that such accounts either misrepresent or ignore something important about the heterogeneous ways in which scientific hypotheses can be supported by evidence, and I (...) go on to suggest that the search for any single such account may be misguided in any case. (shrink)

The author is critical of russell's theory in that his "analysis of sentences containing definite descriptions is very defective" and has too many complications to serve as a "convention for a symbolic language.".

It has been common wisdom for centuries that scientific inference cannot be deductive; if it is inference at all, it must be a distinctive kind of inductive inference. According to demonstrative theories of induction, however, important scientific inferences are not inductive in the sense of requiring ampliative inference rules at all. Rather, they are deductive inferences with sufficiently strong premises. General considerations about inferences suffice to show that there is no difference in justification between an inference construed demonstratively or ampliatively. (...) The inductive risk may be shouldered by premises or rules, but it cannot be shirked. Demonstrative theories of induction might, nevertheless, better describe scientific practice. And there may be good methodological reasons for constructing our inferences one way rather than the other. By exploring the limits of these possible advantages, I argue that scientific inference is neither of essence deductive nor of essence inductive. (shrink)

Background: According to the Declaration of Helsinki, patients who take part in a clinical trial must be adequately informed about the trial's aims, methods, expected benefits, and potential risks. The declaration does not, however, elaborate on what “adequately informed” might amount to, in practice. Medical researchers and Local Research Ethics Committees attempt to ensure that the information which potential participants are given is pitched at an appropriate level, but few studies have considered whether the patients who take part in such (...) trials feel they have been given adequate information, or whether they feel able to understand that information.Objectives: To explore trial participants' views on the amount of information provided, and of their own understanding of that information.Design: Structured interviews of patients participating in clinical trials for the treatment of chronic medical condition.Findings: Patients generally felt they were given an appropriate amount of information, and that they were able to understand all or most of it. They felt they were given adequate time to ask questions before agreeing to take part. In comparison with treatment given outwith the research setting, patients generally felt they received more information when participating in a clinical trial.Conclusions: Researchers sometimes complain that patients are given too much information during clinical trials, and have limited understanding of that information. The present study shows that this perception is not necessarily shared by patients. More research is needed in this area, particularly to gauge whether patient understanding is indeed accurate. (shrink)

The logical positivists’ critical attitude towards metaphysics is sketched. Strawson’s conception of descriptive and revisionary metaphysics is described. Revisionary metaphysics is argued to be chimerical, and descriptive metaphysics is argued not to be a form of metaphysics at all. Strawson’s failure to account for the status of propositions of descriptive metaphysics is held to be remediable by reference to Wittgenstein’s conception of grammatical propositions that express norms of representation.

IΣ n andBΣ n are well known fragments of first-order arithmetic with induction and collection forΣ n formulas respectively;IΣ n 0 andBΣ n 0 are their second-order counterparts. RCA0 is the well known fragment of second-order arithmetic with recursive comprehension;WKL 0 isRCA 0 plus weak König's lemma. We first strengthen Harrington's conservation result by showing thatWKL 0 +BΣ n 0 is Π 1 1 -conservative overRCA 0 +BΣ n 0 . Then we develop some model theory inWKL 0 and illustrate (...) the use of formalized model theory by giving a relatively simple proof of the fact thatIΣ 1 provesBΣ n+1 to be Π n+2-conservative overIΣ n . Finally, we present a proof-theoretic proof of the stronger fact that theΠ n+2 conservation result is provable already inIΔ 0 + superexp. ThusIΣ n+1 proves 1-Con (BΣ n+1) andIΔ 0 +superexp proves Con (IΣ n )↔Con(BΣ n+1). (shrink)

This practical and essential text, co-authored by an engineer and an ethicist, covers ethical dilemmas that any engineer might encounter on the job, emphasizing the responsibility of a practicing engineer to act in an ethical manner. To illustrate the complexities involved, the authors present characters who encounter situations that test the engineering code of ethics. The dialogue between the characters highlights different perspectives of each dilemma. As they proceed through the book, students see how the code of ethics can help (...) in decision making, as well as the implications of various decisions. The philosophical theory that supports the ethical situations encountered is presented as boxed material following each section. Important Notice: Media content referenced within the product description or the product text may not be available in the ebook version. (shrink)

Oestrogen treatment for girls, to prevent psychosocial problems due to extreme tallness, has been available for almost 50 years but uncertainty about its position prevails. The ethical problems of this treatment are focused on in this paper. After a brief overview on historical and medical aspects, ethical issues such as the general justification of oestrogen treatment, evaluation of its success and ethical concerns related to research in this subject are dealt with in detail.